Financing Rebellion: Piracy as a Rebel Group Funding Strategy

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Introduction

• Resources and financing of armed conflict
• Latent resource availability vs. actual resource appropriation
• Criminal activity as a direct and dynamic method to produce gains
Resources and conflict

• State-centered
• Rebel-centered
Expectations

• Insurgents as pirates
• Pirate-insurgent shadow networks
Hypotheses

• Hypothesis: *Piracy incidents are expected to increase civil conflict activity.*
Research Design

• All conflicts in coastal African states 1993-2010
• Unit of analysis conflict-country-month
• DV=Number of UCDP GED conflict events
• IV=Number of piracy incidents
• Controls for natural resources, state capacity, others
Gulf of Guinea 1993-2010
Marginal Effects

![Graph showing marginal effects for various variables including L.Piracy Incidents, Oil Deposits, L.Extractive Capacity, Population, L.Civilian Deaths, Diamonds, L.Conflict Event, L2.Piracy Incidents, L3.Piracy Incidents, L4.Piracy Incidents, L5.Piracy Incidents, L6.Piracy Incidents. Each variable is represented by different markers (o, ●, +, ♦) corresponding to different models (Model 1, Model 2, Model 3, Model 4).]
Conclusion

• Consistent link between piracy and conflict intensity
• Conditional effects to distinguish state vs. rebel-centered dynamics