

## THE HOMEGROWN THREAT

State Strength, Grievance and Domestic Terrorism

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Similar to insurgency, scholars maintain that terrorist violence is precipitated by both relative deprivation and state weakness. Yet intuitively aggrieved minority groups within a country should turn to terrorism when they are weak relative to the state rather than strong. Empirical evidence shows minority group discrimination and fragile political institutions to independently increase domestic terror attacks. But it remains unclear whether grievances drive domestic terrorism in both strong and weak states. Using data from 172 countries between 1998 and 2007, we find that for strong states the presence of minority discrimination leads to increased domestic terrorism while for weak states the presence of minority discrimination actually leads to less domestic terrorism. Consequently, increasing state capacity may not be a panacea for anti-state violence as non-state actors may simply change their strategy from insurgency or guerrilla warfare to terrorism. Efforts to reduce terrorist violence must focus on reducing grievance by eliminating discriminatory policies at the same time as measures to improve state capacity are enacted.

**Key words:** Domestic Terrorism, state strength, minority discrimination, democracy, civil war

Extant research explores the direct effects of both minority discrimination and state weakness on terrorism (Piazza 2011, 2012; Piazza 2008; Lai 2007; Bradley 2006). For example, Crenshaw (1981) insists that the existence of concrete grievances among an identifiable subgroup of a larger population, such as an ethnic minority discriminated by a majority, is an important factor explaining terrorism. And, evidence from single country studies as well large-N cross-national research shows minority economic discrimination to be a robust predictor of political violence (Buendia 2005; Whittaker 2001; Ergil 2000; Piazza 2011, 2012). Similarly, the ability of non-state groups to actively target government offices depends importantly on regime strength. Indeed, one of the most permissive causes of terrorism is a government's inability or unwillingness to prevent it (Crenshaw 1981). Less is known, however, about the effects of grievance on terrorism across values of state capacity. Yet the interactive relationship is largely what our theoretical models of terrorism imply. It is only in the presence of discrimination and repression that a demand for political violence emerges. Further, while empirical evidence shows state weakness associated with domestic terrorism, we should actually expect stronger states to experience higher levels of terrorist violence, at least when accompanied by significant discrimination.

Terrorism is often described as a strategy of the weak (Kydd and Walter 2006). Aggrieved groups resort to terrorism when they lack popular support and are relatively fragile in comparison to the state. It is strong states, such as Israel, the United Kingdom and Spain that experience significant terrorism while weaker countries such as the Sudan, Central African Republic, and Chad see very little terrorist violence.<sup>1</sup> Even in weak states that experience

<sup>1</sup> Sudan, Central African Republic and Chad experienced an average of 0.63 attacks per year between 1970 and 1990. For the same period, Israel, Spain and United Kingdom suffered from an average of 42.63 yearly attacks of domestic terrorism.

terrorism, like Peru, India and Bangladesh, the attacks generally occur in urban centers where governments are comparatively strong.

In this paper, we examine how state strength and minority discrimination interact to produce high levels of domestic terrorism. We insist that state strength plays an important role in facilitating the use of terrorism by aggrieved groups. Tactical choices by violent non-state actors depend on the strength of groups relative to the state. In a weak state, minority groups may be able to engage in more conventional armed conflict with government forces in order to redress grievances (De la Calle and Sanchez-Cuenca 2012). Strong states, in contrast, can inflict great harm on rebel groups in a direct fight and therefore, aggrieved minority groups will turn to terrorist operations against non-combatants to impose costs on a state. Using data from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), we empirically test whether regime strength, coupled with minority discrimination, drives homegrown terrorism. The evidence we uncover strongly suggests that for capable states terrorism is increasingly likely as minority discrimination increases.<sup>2</sup> In contrast, violent non-state actors turn to more conventional attacks against regime forces when confronting relatively weak states. The presence of weak regimes in Africa, for example, has meant little terrorism but significant political violence in the form of insurgency. These results contrast with most extant research on domestic terrorism, which concludes that state weakness and not state strength facilitates terrorist violence.

The paper proceeds as follows. First, we review extant research on political violence, focusing specifically on grievance and opportunity as drivers. We then develop an argument about the conditional relationship between discrimination, state strength, and domestic terrorism.

<sup>2</sup>We focus on domestic terrorism because it is a far more frequent occurrence than international terrorism although the latter may generate more media attention (Abadie 2006). In fact, domestic terrorism represents by far the greatest type of terrorist violence observed (see Figure 1). Of the nearly 60,000 terrorism incidents recorded in the Global Terrorism Database, local, within country groups, produce 78% of the attacks.

Most theoretical models of terrorism, we believe, imply this interactive relationship. Next we present our empirical research design, operationalize theoretical concepts, and describe our data. Using multiple indicators of both grievance and opportunity, we find strong and consistent evidence that in stronger states, not weaker ones, terrorism is employed by violent non-state actors when grievances are present. We also find persuasive evidence that domestic terrorism correlates spatially suggesting that counter-terror strategies to be effective must consider political violence in neighboring states. We conclude with suggestions for future research.

**(Figure 1 here)**

### **Minority Discrimination, State weakness and Terrorism**

Discrimination and repression produce the conditions under which terrorist groups develop and thrive (Crenshaw 1981). Population subgroups like “ethnic minorities” that are “discriminated against by the majority population” develop into social movements that then agitate for policy change (Piazza 2012). Minority groups in many countries have little political clout and ethnic, linguistic, and religious fault-lines are frequently the basis for political mobilization. When political parties are organized along such polarized lines, discrimination against minorities can become institutionalized. Social exclusion and alienation from the mainstream economic system leaves aggrieved minority populations distrustful of state institutions and authority and, thereby, more susceptible to radicalization, which provides fertile ground for recruitment into violent rebel movements. Several empirical studies show that marginalized ethnic, racial, and social minority groups are likely to support political violence to highlight their exclusion and discrimination. Gurr and Moore (1997), for example, find that the chances of rebellion by minority ethno-political groups increase if such groups face high levels

of discrimination in a state.<sup>3</sup> Further, rebellion, infighting, and secession result from high degrees of exclusion and segmentation, not from diversity as others have noted (see Clark 1984; Cleary 2000). Indeed, Roessler (2011) finds that, in the first three years after being purged from the central government, co-conspirators and their co-ethnics are 15 times more likely to rebel than when they are represented at the apex of the regime.

Recent cross-national research has also shown discrimination to be a critical correlate of terrorist violence. Lai (2007), for example, shows that discrimination against minority groups encourages a resort to transnational terrorism. And, Piazza's (2011, 2012) work demonstrates that minority economic discrimination is a significant, positive predictor of domestic terror attacks. Feldman and Perala (2004) further note that government repression drives up terrorist violence, at least in Latin American countries. Discrimination and repression it seems create the grievances that fuel the emergence of violent non-state actors that use a variety of tactics to move government elites and policy.

Extant research also connects government weakness to the emergence of violent non-state actors. Fearon and Laitin (2003), for example, argue that states that are financially, bureaucratically or politically weak make attractive targets for rebellion. The key reasons lie in the inability of fragile states to control remote areas as well as develop and implement effective counter-insurgency strategies. Indeed, as Tellefsen and Buhaug (2014, 2) write "a notable feature of today's armed conflicts is their tendency to cluster along peripheral state borders that cut across traditional ethnic minority homelands." The distance between government strongholds and rebel clusters provides some measure of protection for insurgents. Governments remain unable to project power over difficult terrain and large distances thereby creating safe-havens for

<sup>3</sup>Also see Wimmer, Cederman and Min (2009) who note that rebellion is more likely in states that exclude large portions of the population on the basis of ethnic background.

rebels. Further, if state weakness results from incoherent political organization (Bodea 2012), then it likely creates volatility, disorganization and short time horizons that can be perceived as opportunities by latent rebel leaders (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Englebort and Ron 2004).

A similar logic may apply to the emergence of terrorist organizations as well. Lai (2007) finds that trans-national terrorist groups emerge when terrorists can both easily evade government forces and effectively recruit from the local population. A similar study by Piazza (2008) finds states plagued by chronic weakness are more likely to host terrorist groups that commit trans-national attacks and are also more likely to be targeted by trans-national terrorists themselves. Since weak states lack the resources and or the will to combat terrorist cells, political and geographic space opens that enables terrorist groups to survive. In fact, state weakness lowers the cost of fighting and thus makes the individual decision to join a violent non-state group easier.

Research connecting regime type to internal political violence extends our understanding of the role played by both discrimination and state weakness. Due to their openness, democracies may provoke terrorism as such regimes find it difficult to prevent, or retaliate against, violent political expression (Eyerman 1998; Eubank and Weinberg 1994; Schmid 1992). Democracies allow their citizens, and terrorists by default, freedom of movement, association, easy access to public buildings, and generally require rigorous proof of guilt in order to detain or convict a suspect (Schmid 1992). Alternatively, democracies might reduce terrorism because greater freedom allows popular participation and alleviates grievance (Windsor 2003). The same protections that afford groups the space to organize and strategize should also reduce the demand for political violence. Indeed, domestic groups within a democratic state presumably can seek policy change through non-violent action.

The countervailing effects of democracy on terrorism have resulted in empirical evidence that remains unclear. One group of scholars maintains that democracies should be less likely to experience domestic terrorist incidents as a result of political openness, the ability to petition peacefully for a redress of grievances, and minority group protections (Schmid 1992; Rummel 1995). Others, however, contend that democracies provide fertile ground for domestic terrorism as a result of legal constraints on government action, which ultimately enable groups to mobilize (Eubank and Weinberg 1994; Pape 2003). Both groups uncover supporting evidence. Abadie (2006), for instance, finds that the absence of political rights increases the risk of terrorism, while Feldman and Perala (2004) show that terrorism is more likely to occur in weakly institutionalized democratic regimes.<sup>4</sup> Savun and Phillips (2009) find democracy to have little effect on homegrown terrorism, but Choi (2010) concludes that the likelihood of both domestic and international terrorist events decreases as the quality of the rule of law improves. This mixed and inconsistent evidence suggests that the relationship between regime type and domestic terrorism may be spurious and or nonlinear. Or perhaps the inclusion of a regime type variable masks clearer effects from more critical covariates such as state strength and discrimination. Further, a regime type measure as well as separate indicators for grievance and opportunity all fails to capture and assess the combined effects that government weakness and discrimination have on domestic terrorism.

### **Grievances and Opportunity Together Drive Domestic Terrorism**

Concrete grievances among an identifiable subgroup of a larger population remain a near necessary condition for the emergence of political violence (Crenshaw 1981). Government

<sup>4</sup>These are regimes characterized by some measure of political and civil liberties but concomitantly by a deficient rule of law and widespread human rights violations (Feldmann and Perala 2004). This finding supports the theoretical expectation that terror is more likely to be adopted as an opposition strategy in political settings where resource mobilization is possible, but where peaceful protest generally produces few tangible results.

policies that discriminate against minority groups who may not share certain characteristics with those of the dominant group(s)—and who may have historically suffered from social, ethnic, political, and/or religious discrimination—engender resentment. However, grievances alone do not drive political violence. An environment where social and or political movements can develop in order to redress these grievances is also critical (Tilly 1978). Indeed, Collier and Hoeffler (2004) have suggested that political weakness remains the principal driver of internal conflict since dissatisfaction within a state remains pervasive thus making the opportunity to engage in political violence the only factor that covaries (also see Fearon and Laitin 2003; Englebert and Ron 2004; Lai 2007; Bodea 2012). As Lai (2007, 298) writes, “...the ability for groups to recruit, organize, and train is likely to be contingent on their ability to avoid detection by the government.”

Many studies on civil wars, insurgencies, and failed states (Ganguly 2001; Takeyh and Gvosdev 2002; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Sahay 2004; Salehyan 2005; Asal, Schulzke and Pate 2014) point out that rebel bases outside the sovereign territory of an antagonist state provides groups the freedom to act. Insurgents can slip across remote and un-secured borders to carry out attacks but then return back to their foreign shelters. For example, Kashmiri rebels often cross over into Indian territory to carry out attacks. Their bases in Pakistan, however, remain secure from Indian intervention (Praagh 2003). A strong state, on the other hand, is more likely to protect its border, making cross-border infiltration of rebels considerably more difficult. Therefore, rebel groups are compelled to locate inside the country’s borders. In a strong state, an organization located wholly within the territory of the government is severely constrained in what it can do and is likely to pay a high cost if it turns to violence (Asal, Schulzke and Pate 2014). In such a situation, a rebel group is forced to rely on other means to accomplish its



political objectives. Those means may involve non-violent protest and or working within the legal political process. Alternatively, those means may involve the use of terror.

Despite theoretical arguments suggesting terrorism reflects non-state group weakness, evidence appears to suggest rather a relationship between *weak states* and terrorist violence. Indeed, Lai (2007) finds four separate operationalizations of state capacity (civil war, interstate war, population, and neighboring terrorism) to associate with international terrorism. And Lai (2007, 299) concludes that “states are likely to be greater producers of terrorism when they impose low costs on groups for mobilizing and operating out of state” and further notes that “low-cost states are likely to attract groups from high-cost environments.” But groups that are small and weak rather than large and strong relative to the state should turn to terrorism as the optimal strategy. Terrorist violence is a strategy of the weak in two senses: first, terrorist organizations are weak relative to the extensive demands they make, and second they are weak relative to their targets - usually states (Frieden, Lake and Schultz 2010). Terrorists are typically extremists in the sense that their interests and methods may not be widely shared by the larger population they claim to fight for. This condition means that the problem of recruitment is particularly acute, since the pool of motivated individuals is relatively small, and extremists have difficulty convincing others to join their cause. There is evidence that groups resort to terrorism after they fail to mobilize the masses for their cause. For example, the failure of Russian anarchists to incite the rural peasantry motivated them to adopt a more terrorist-oriented strategy in the latter half of nineteenth century (Pomper 1995). If violent non-state groups can muster enough popular support for their cause, they will usually convert to a more traditional insurgent group directly challenging the state using more conventional warfare strategies.

Strong rebel groups with control over territory are likely to directly challenge the state out in the open (De la Calle and Sanchez-Cuenca 2012). Some insurgencies are sufficiently robust to actually seize territory and consequently replace the authority of the state in that locale. Once rebels have territorial control, local dwellers may be forced to join their ranks and pay taxes, endowing the non-state group with enough manpower and offensive capabilities to directly attack the state and its security forces. When the state can effectively project power over large distances, insurgents are no longer able to liberate territory from the state's control and further have difficulty finding sanctuary. In such strong states, rebels are compelled to go underground and target defenseless civilians in clandestine attacks. Moreover, when rebel groups control territory, they often substitute the state in providing public services. In the Maoist bastion of central India, rebels are highly visible providing health services, building roads, running schools and even dispensing justice in temporary courts (Roy 2012). Offering social services improves an organization's capacity to engage in violence by increasing popular support for the rebel organization. Indeed, social services serve directly as a means of recruitment and also assist in buying acquiescence from the local populace to rebel activities (Asal, Schulzke and Pate 2014). Therefore, in countries that possess more capable and effective governing institutions, violent anti-state groups will by necessity turn to terrorism as a method of highlighting grievances, undermining state authority, attracting recruits and raising resources.

It is weakness that motivates the targeting of unarmed civilians. The object of terrorism is to bypass the other side's military, as direct confrontation would result in certain defeat, and inflict cost on the target population in order to extract political concessions from the state. One sees that even rebel groups use terrorism, but typically in areas where they are weak. For instance, Maoist rebels in India directly engage security forces within their strongholds in central

India, but they attack civilians in urban centers where they are weak (see SAPT 2013). The weakness of the terrorist groups not only influences their resource mobilization, but also selection of weapons and their organizational structure. Whereas state governments have the ability to raise funds through taxation for security and intelligence personnel, terrorist organizations are resource-poor and only minimally armed. They often resort to illegal activities like currency counterfeiting, bank robbery or drug trafficking to mobilize resources (Chalk 1997; Lowe 2006; Hutchinson and Pat O'malley 2007). In many cases, improvised explosive devices (IEDs) are the weapons of choice for terrorist groups. Resource-starved terrorist groups can hardly afford costly weapons. The organizational structure of terrorist groups also shows their weakness. The loosely connected networks of small self-contained cells are designed to avoid detection and possible capture by government forces (Dishman 2005). Such organizational structures speak volumes to their weakness in relation to states. The extremist sections of national minority groups generally face the collective might of both a national majority and a state, which are highly resistant to their demands. In the face of such powerful opposition, minorities are more likely to choose terrorism as their strategy. In their cost-benefit calculations, a strong state should intuitively motivate a minority group to resort to terrorist violence. The above discussion leads us to the following one hypothesis.

**H<sub>1</sub>:** For strong/capable states, the presence of grievances will lead to an increase in domestic terrorism.

### **Research Design**

To test the above hypothesis, we use a GEE estimator with a negative binomial specification and an AR(1) error structure. We build a country-year database of 172 countries

from 1998 to 2007.<sup>5</sup> Enders, Sandler and Gaibullov (2011) constructed the most reliable dataset on domestic terrorism by separating domestic from international terrorist events published in the widely used Global Terrorism Database (GTD). GTD is a publicly available, open source event-count database of aggregated domestic and international terrorist attacks from 1970 to 2014 built and managed by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, housed at the University of Maryland.<sup>6</sup> Enders, Sandler and Gaibullov (2011, p.3), first of all, remove those observations from the GTD that do not fall within their definition of terrorism<sup>7</sup> and then classify the remaining observations as transnational or domestic in orientation. Between 1970 and 2007, 12,862 transnational terrorist incidents are identified. As a comparison, ITERATE (International Terrorism: Attributes of Events) records 12,784 transnational terrorist incidents over the same time frame (Mickolus, Sandler, Murdock and Flemming 2009). Although the GTD and ITERATE datasets differ on some incidents, the nearly identical numbers support the methodological choices by Enders, Sandler and Gaibullov (2011). Next, after identifying uncertain incidents<sup>8</sup>, the remaining 46,413 incidents are identified as domestic terrorist events. This differentiated dataset covers the period between 1970 and 2007.

<sup>5</sup>We choose the time period of 1998–2007 for specific reasons. Pape, Ruby, Bauer and Jenkins (2014) have identified several inconsistencies in the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) collection method and recommended breaking the GTD data into four distinct datasets, each based on a consistent collection method. Those are: 1990 - 1997, 1998 – 2007/8, 2008 – 2011 and 2011 -2014. The Enders Sandler and Gaibullov (2011) data on domestic terrorism used in our study are based on GTD, and are available for the period of 1970 to 2007. We decided to test our hypothesis on data for the years between 1998 and 2007 because, firstly, data on many of our explanatory variables are available for this time period. World Bank data on Government Effectiveness and Lack of Corruption are available from 1996 onwards. The State Fragility Index data start from 1996. Secondly, GTD provides limited data on terrorist incidents for the year 1993. The results of our empirical models might be biased if we include 1993 in our analysis.

<sup>6</sup>Access to the raw GTD database, along with descriptions of count methods and operationalization of terrorism, is available online at: <http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/>.

<sup>7</sup> Terrorism is the premeditated use or threat to use violence by individuals or subnational groups against noncombatants in order to obtain a political or social objective through the intimidation of a large audience beyond that of the immediate victims.

<sup>8</sup>Uncertain observations include incidents involving insurgency or guerilla warfare, internecine conflict, mass murder, and criminal acts.

The dependent variable for our empirical models is a country-year count of domestic terrorist incidents derived from the above mentioned dataset developed by Enders, Sandler and Gaibullov (2011). The number of incidents per year measures the existence of terrorism and how prevalent terrorism is in a particular country. The country-year count has been used widely by scholars in studies of terrorism (Li and Schaub 2004; Lai 2007; Krieger and Meierrieks 2010; Piazza 2011). We operationalize minority discrimination, one of our primary theoretical variables, using two distinct measures. First, we use the percentage of the discriminated population taken from EPR dataset (Wimmer, Cederman and Min 2009). The Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) data set identifies all politically relevant ethnic categories around the world and measures access to executive-level state power for members of these ethnic categories in all years from 1946 to 2010. Discrimination is defined as the exclusion from political power; politically excluded people are likely to be deprived of several public good provisions like education, employment and other benefits. Second, we measure minority discrimination using the Economic Discrimination Index (ECDIS) from the Minorities at Risk dataset. ECDIS is coded as a five-point ordinal measure ranging from 0 for no discrimination/no minority at risk group to 4 for extreme minority discrimination with the connivance of the state (Minorities at Risk Project 2009).

We use five distinct measures to get at state capacity. The State Fragility Index produced by the Center for Systemic Peace is used as the first direct measure of state weakness. The State Fragility Index—a 0 to 25 composite score—measures the political effectiveness and legitimacy of a state, with higher values corresponding to weaker states (Marshall and Cole 2010). The index is available from 1995. The second indicator of state strength measures the overall effectiveness of governments using data from the World Bank Governance Indicators (World

Bank Group 2012). Government effectiveness measures “perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies” (Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2009). The third indicator of state strength measures overall lack of corruption using data from the same source, World Bank Governance Indicators (World Bank Group 2012). Control of corruption captures perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as “capture” of the state by elites and private interests. The data are based on “surveys of firms and individuals, as well as the assessments of commercial risk rating agencies, non-governmental organizations, and a number of multilateral aid agencies and other public sector organizations” (Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2009). The units in which governance, both effectiveness and corruption, are measured follow a normal distribution with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one in each period. All scores lie between -2.5 and 2.5, with higher scores corresponding to better outcomes (i.e. better governance). Information on these two measures of state strength is available from 1996 to 2013.

The last direct measure of state strength is relative political capacity. Political extraction measures the ability of a government to extract resources from a population given their level of economic development. Efficient governments are able to meet or exceed their expected extractive capabilities; inefficient governments fail to reach their expected extraction levels. This measure of efficiency also represents the ability of a government to implement a set of policy choices: politically capable governments will be able to change or influence policy - pursuing their political and economic goals while preserving political stability. A state's ability to extract taxes from society is considered to be one of the most valid indicators of state capacity (Hendrix

2010; Buhaug 2010). We use data on relative extractive capacity rather than absolute taxing capacity to better account for structural differences between economies. This measure is a ratio of the actual level of extraction and the predicted value of extraction in a country based on its economic endowment (Arbetman-Rabinowitz, Kugler, Abodollahiam, Kang, Nelson and Tammen 2012). The relative extractive capacity measure ranges from 0.1 to 3.61 with higher values representing a greater state capacity to extract resources from the population and, hence, greater state strength. Both RPC-GDP and RPC-AGRI measure relative extractive capacity but the latter includes agricultural income among the economic endowments. All the measures of state weakness/strength are lagged by one year to avoid the problem of simultaneity.

Several controls that frequently appear in empirical studies of terrorism (Li 2005; Wade and Reiter 2007; Piazza 2011) are included in all of our models. We control for civil<sup>9</sup> and interstate conflict in each of our empirical models. Governments confronting armed insurgencies are not likely to have the resources available to effectively control their territory, allowing groups to organize without fear of government reprisals (Lai 2007). Interstate wars also likely limit the resources available to governments to fight internal political violence like domestic terrorism. Interstate conflict can potentially create a situation where a government's engagement with a state rival makes it vulnerable to higher levels of terrorist violence. Both civil and interstate conflicts are defined by a minimum threshold of 1000 battle-related deaths. Both variables come from the Uppsala/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset version 4 (Themnér and Wallensteen 2013).<sup>10</sup> The variables are lagged by one year.

<sup>9</sup> We include civil war defined as 1000 battle deaths as dummy in all the models. Some groups engaged in civil war also use terrorism as a strategy. Controlling for civil war increases our confidence that large-scale political conflict within countries isn't driving our results. However, we ran models excluding the civil war dummy and our results remain unchanged.

<sup>10</sup> Access to the raw Uppsala/PRIO database, along with descriptions and operationalizations of civil war and interstate war, is available online at: <http://www.prio.no/Data/Armed-Conflict/>.

The Polity IV dataset (Marshall and Jaggers 2010) is used to operationalize regime type. The Polity IV conceptual scheme examines concomitant qualities of democratic and autocratic authority in governing institutions, rather than discreet and mutually exclusive forms of governance. This perspective envisions a spectrum of governing authority that spans from fully institutionalized autocracies through mixed, or incoherent, authority regimes to fully institutionalized democracies. The “Polity Score” captures this regime authority spectrum on a 21-point scale ranging from -10 (hereditary monarchy) to +10 (consolidated democracy) and consists of six component measures that record key qualities of executive recruitment, constraints on executive authority, and political competition. It also records changes in the institutionalized qualities of governing authority. Using the combined 21 points democracy-autocracy scale, states are coded as one of three regime types: autocratic (less than or equal to -6), anocratic (-5 to 5), and democratic (6 to 10). This breakdown is common in research using these data (Mansfield and Snyder 2002). The empirical models include two of the categorical variables—anocracy and democracy. Autocracy is the excluded baseline category.

The population of a country is often used in empirical studies of terrorism with the expectation that countries with greater populations experience more terrorist attacks than less populated ones. More populous states provide terrorist organizations with a broader recruitment pool and increase the monitoring costs for a government (Lai 2007). The population of a country changes slowly over the years, but it varies a great deal across the 172 countries in the models. The data on this variable come from the Penn World database (Heston, Summers and Aten 2012). The natural log of total population is used in the models.

We also include a measure of economic development. Although extant empirical evidence does not conclusively demonstrate a relationship between poverty and terrorism, many



studies consider economic grievance an important factor driving individuals to political violence. Therefore, the natural log of gross domestic product per capita held at current international dollars is used as a control variable in the empirical models. The data on this variable come from the Penn World database (Heston, Summers and Aten 2012). GDP per capita is lagged by one year. The final control variable included in our models is level of domestic terrorism in neighboring countries. Lai (2007) has argued that regional levels of terrorism lower the costs of operating within a state. Terrorists in one state may influence those in a neighboring state by providing groups a standard by which to organize and produce successful attacks. Additionally, terrorists in one state may receive training and financing from terrorists in other states. We control for domestic terrorism in neighboring countries by calculating the spatial lag of terrorism based on inverted distance. Lai (2007) finds that trans-national terrorists cluster in space. The variable, neighboring terrorism, in our models measures whether the incidence of domestic terrorism in one country is influenced by domestic terrorism in proximate states.<sup>11</sup> The variable is a continuous indicator ranging from 1.47 to 34.88 calculated annually for each country in the dataset and is lagged by one year. The summary statistics for all the variables are provided in the Appendix section (Appendix Table A)

## **Results and Analysis**

Our analyses cover 172 countries from 1998 to 2007. Owing to missing data for some cases, the sample size varies approximately between 1274 and 1500 observations, depending on the model. Because the dependent variable is an event count, ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates can be inefficient, inconsistent, and biased (Long 1997). Our decision to use negative binomial estimators – rather than ordinary least squares or Poisson models – is recommended by

<sup>11</sup>The CShapes dataset was used to create the inverted distance interdependence matrix (Weidmann, Kuse and Gleditsch 2010).

some unique features of the dependent variable. First, it is a count measurement that cannot include negative values. Second, the data are unevenly distributed across cases and years, resulting in a wide difference between the mean and standard deviation. The Poisson regression model is often used with event counts, in which the mean of the Poisson distribution is conditional on the independent variables. But the Poisson regression model assumes that the conditional mean of the dependent variable equals the conditional variance. The violation of this assumption in our models tends to produce biased standard errors and possibly spurious statistical significance (Li and Schaub 2004).<sup>12</sup> To address cross-sectional and temporal non-independence, we control for the panel structure of the data and add an AR(1) error term to our models. Further, the data on population, GDP per capita and spatial dispersion (neighboring terrorism) are all logged. We also control for the US military occupations of Iraq and Afghanistan to be sure our results are not driven by the spikes in domestic terrorism observed at these times (which they aren't).

Table 1 presents our findings for the direct effects of state capacity and discrimination (using EPR) on domestic terrorism. The models in Table 1 use five separate measures of state weakness/strength to confirm the robustness of our posited relationships. We find that the percentage of discriminated population is positively related to domestic terrorism at statistically significant levels. Interestingly, the square of the percentage of discriminated population has statistically significant negative coefficients in each model. Domestic terrorism increases as more people are politically discriminated, but domestic terrorism decreases as the percentage of discriminated population becomes very high. This finding supports our theoretical expectation that terrorism is a strategy of the weak. If large numbers of people were discriminated, rebel groups representing such populations would be strong enough to engage in more conventional

<sup>12</sup> The dependent variable has a mean of 5.29 and standard deviation of 26.37.

warfare against the discriminatory state. So, despite an inverted U relationship, a higher percentage of discriminated people, while associated with somewhat less domestic terrorism, likely does not mean less overall political violence. Groups presumably are transitioning away from terror to more conventional armed attacks against state security forces. We also find three measures of state capacity statistically related to domestic terrorism, confirming earlier research by Piazza (2008) and Lai (2007). Fragile states as well as less effective and more corrupt states tend to experience more domestic terrorism. The two variables of state strength that rely upon measures of extractive capacity do not reach commonly accepted levels of statistical significance.

**(Table 1 here)**

Table 2 presents our findings for the direct effects of discrimination (using MAR) and state capacity on domestic terrorism. The table once again includes five separate empirical models, presenting evidence on the direct relationship between minority discrimination and domestic terrorism as well as the direct relationship between five measures of state strength and domestic terrorism. We again observe that minority discrimination is positively related to domestic terrorism at statistically significant levels in all five of the empirical models. Domestic terrorism increases as levels of minority economic discrimination go up. This supports earlier findings by Piazza (2011, 2012) that minority economic discrimination is a major driver of domestic terrorism. We also observe once again that weak states associate with domestic terrorism. The results presented in Table 2 exactly reflect those in Table 1. Thus, we find that both political exclusion (EPR) and economic discrimination (MAR) lead to a higher risk of domestic terrorism.

**(Table 2 here)**

Nearly all of the control variables included in the models presented in Tables 1 and 2 are statistically significant and in the expected directions. Two control variables—civil conflict and population—correlate with the incidence of domestic terrorism. Countries experiencing armed rebellions are considerably more likely to face domestic terrorism. We observe the natural log of population to have a strong, positive, and statistically significant relationship to domestic terrorism. More populous states make it easier for groups to operate by increasing the potential pool of recruits and increasing the costs to the government for monitoring all its citizens. Lai's (2007) findings on the production of trans-national terrorism are supported in our study on home-grown terrorism.

In all models (Tables 1 & 2), democracy and anocracy are both positively related to domestic terrorism at statistically significant levels. Crenshaw (1981) argues that modern liberal democratic states may be viewed as weak by terrorists since security forces are constrained by the rule of law. Although our evidence shows anocratic and democratic political systems to experience higher levels of domestic terrorism compared to autocratic systems, we find that democracies confront the highest risk of homegrown terrorism. This finding is driven mostly by emergent and under-developed democratic states. Logged GDP per capita is also related the incidence of domestic terrorism. Economic prosperity increases the expected annual number of attacks in a country. This finding supports earlier empirical studies that found terrorism occurring in a country to be positively associated with the country's wealth or economic development (Burgoon 2006; Berrebi 2007; Lai 2007). Not only may relatively richer countries compared to poorer countries have more skillful workers, but also terrorism is often the handiwork of an ideologically driven middle class intelligentsia (Pomper 1995). An

exceptionally poor country may not have the educated middle class whose dissatisfaction would lead to homegrown terrorism.

Domestic terrorism also appears to be spatially concentrated. Our measure of spatial contagion, which counts the number of attacks in each country and weights that number by inverted distance between countries, is positive and statistically significant. This indicates that terrorism in country is driven higher by terrorism occurring in contiguous countries. Not only may separate terrorist groups in a region cooperate in training and fund raising, but they also may flow easily across state borders seeking sanctuary. Finally, we find strong evidence that the US interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan<sup>13</sup> are responsible for a spike in domestic terrorist incidents. Not only did the interventions increase the number of domestic attacks, but also the effect of this control variable is substantively large. Interstate war has no statistical relationship with domestic terrorism; a state engaged in interstate war neither increases nor decreases the risk of domestic terrorism. Figure 2 presents the marginal effects for all the variables measuring discrimination and state strength in our models.

**(Figure 2 here)**

**(Tables 3 & 4 here)**

We now move to a discussion of our empirical results relating directly to our primary theoretical argument that discrimination and state capacity interact to produce domestic terrorism (H<sub>1</sub>). We find strong evidence that grievance and opportunity jointly produce domestic terrorism. The coefficient for the interaction between state fragility and political discrimination is negative and significant, indicating that domestic terrorism decreases in weak states in the presence of minority political discrimination. The risk of domestic terrorism is higher in stronger states when segments of minority population suffer from political exclusion from state power. The positive

<sup>13</sup>A control for the U.S. military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq could not be included in models using the State Fragility Index since the index does not record values for either state during these years.

and significant coefficients for the government effectiveness and percentage of discriminated population interaction, and the lack of corruption and political discrimination interaction, respectively, confirm a similar relationship. The interaction between relative extractive capacity (both variables) and political discrimination is also positive and statistically significant. As state strength increases the likelihood of terrorist attacks increases if groups are discriminated.

Similarly, findings in Table 4 support our conditional hypothesis ( $H_1$ ). Table 4 presents five models showing interactions between a measure of minority economic discrimination (MAR) as grievance and five separate measures of state strength as opportunity. All of the coefficients of the interaction terms are significant in expected direction. When state fragility increases, a state that economically discriminates against one or more national minorities is likely to experience decreased levels of domestic terrorism. This implies that a weaker state will experience more direct challenges from rebel groups that now have little need to hide among civilians as terrorists do to avoid capture. The positive and significant coefficients for the government effectiveness and minority economic discrimination interaction, and the lack of corruption and economic discrimination interaction, respectively, confirm a similar relationship. The interaction between relative extractive capacity (both variables) and minority economic discrimination is also positive and statistically significant. National minority groups face all sorts of organizational weaknesses and resource scarcity. In challenging a strong state, such groups do not choose a strategy of direct confrontation that will likely lead to capture or death. Therefore, these weak groups are more apt to choose terrorism as a strategy.<sup>14</sup> Figure 3 presents the plots for the interactions between political exclusion and state weakness/strength. Similarly, Figure 4

<sup>14</sup> As many groups engaged in civil wars use terrorism as strategy, someone would argue that we are including violence practiced by such groups in our models. Therefore, we deleted all the incidents of terrorism for countries engaged in civil war (1000 or more deaths), substituted those country years with zero and ran all our models. The results remained unchanged. Moreover, Enders, Sandler and Gaibulloev (2011) have removed possible incidents relating to civil war from the dataset (see Footnote 8)

presents the plots for the interactions between minority economic discrimination and state weakness/strength. The figures demonstrate that stronger states experience *more* domestic terrorism as minority discrimination increases.

**(Figures 3 & 4 here)**

### **Conclusion and Implications**

The results from our analyses strongly support our theoretical expectation that strong states and not weak ones experience more domestic terrorism when discrimination is present. More capable governments prevent aggrieved groups from building and mobilizing an effective rebel army that can directly challenge the state. Terrorist violence is the consequence. Our findings challenge conclusions by Lai (2007) regarding trans-national terrorism. Whereas Lai finds that states with low capacities cannot adequately monitor and police their own territories and thus become swamps for international terrorists, we observe that institutionally strong countries become swamps for domestic terrorists when discrimination is present. Our results also complement research on the onset of civil war (Fearon and Laitin 2003). Strong states rarely experience intra-state violence both in the form of insurgency and in the form of civil war, but such studies (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Englebert and Ron 2004; Bodea 2012) do not model terrorist violence. Intuitively, if weak states experience more conventional warfare like insurgency and civil war, strong states should experience more unconventional warfare like terrorism. Our findings, that stronger states rather than weaker ones, remain more vulnerable to domestic terrorism when minority discrimination is present, support the second part of this intuitive logic.

Conflict resolution in any society requires the elimination of socio-economic conditions that can lead to alienation and trigger political violence. Our findings suggest that political

exclusion and economic discrimination constitute major grievances that lead groups to challenge the state. These results also support earlier studies that find fair treatment and equal access to public goods helps promote peaceful relations (Piazza, 2012, 2011; Bradley, 2006). Since terrorism is a result of both grievances and opportunities together, removal of either might be a good policy choice. Both Lai (2007) and Piazza (2008) conclude that increasing state capacity should eliminate most terrorism. Our study, however, suggests that increasing state capacity might encourage rebel groups to change their strategy from insurgency or guerrilla warfare to urban-based terrorism. Therefore, a better policy option for states confronting violent non-state actors is to address the issue of grievances directly by including minorities in the political process and eliminating economic discrimination. While institution building must be a core part of any effort to address terrorist violence, if these institutions deliberately exclude minority groups from public goods then they are unlikely to be viewed as legitimate and grievances will not abate. Therefore, extending minority rights and facilitating inclusive governance directly eliminates grievances, which remain the root cause of domestic terrorism.

This paper leaves room for future research on critical drivers of domestic terrorism. For example, Figure A in the Appendix illustrates the interactive relationship between regime type, economic discrimination, and domestic terrorism. Our preliminary evidence shows that democracies, especially un-consolidated democracies, remain unable to suppress political violence. In fact, democratic states that discriminate against minority groups, politically and economically, suffer from high levels of domestic terrorism, higher than non-democracies that similarly discriminate against minorities. This finding drives our current and future research efforts as we think a better understanding of the conditions in democratic states that associate with domestic terrorism will aid public authorities and political elites in their efforts to craft



effective counter-terror strategies and policy solutions to mitigate this form of political violence. Further, our argument suggests that weak states increase the risk of civil war in the presence of discrimination and preliminary evidence appears to show empirical support for this relationship.

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
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
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**Figure 1:** A Comparison of Domestic and Transnational Terrorism


Source: Enders et al., 2011

Figure 2: Marginal Effect of State Strength Across the 5 Models






**Figure 3:** Marginal Effect of Repression (Discriminated Population) Conditional on State Strength



Thick dashed lines give 95% confidence interval.  
Thin dashed line is a kernel density estimate of each state strength measure

Figure 4: Marginal Effect of Repression (MAR) Conditional on State Strength



Thick dashed lines give 95% confidence interval.  
Thin dashed line is a kernel density estimate of each state strength measure.

**Appendix Figure A:** The Marginal Effect of Democracy and Minority Economic Discrimination on Domestic Terrorism Incidents, 1970-2007




Table 1: Direct Effects of State Capacity and Minority Discrimination on Domestic Terrorism, 1998-2007 (Using EPR Measure)

<i>Model</i>	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	<i>Fragility</i>	<i>Effectiveness</i>	<i>Corruption</i>	<i>RPC-GDP</i>	<i>RPC-AGRI</i>
<i>Variables</i>					
<i>State Capacity</i> <sub><i>t-1</i></sub>	0.142** (0.017)	-0.508** (0.095)	-0.313** (0.081)	0.092 (0.150)	-0.052 (0.162)
<i>Disc. Population %</i>	8.629** (1.403)	10.539** (1.426)	10.098** (1.386)	10.395** (1.349)	10.514** (1.354)
<i>Disc. Population %</i> <sup>2</sup>	-12.409** (3.551)	-13.285** (3.433)	-12.162** (3.333)	-13.176** (3.258)	-13.431** (3.271)
<i>Civil War</i> <sub><i>t-1</i></sub>	0.828** (0.182)	0.725** (0.169)	0.914** (0.168)	1.005** (0.166)	1.031** (0.168)
<i>IS War</i> <sub><i>t-1</i></sub>	-0.329 (0.367)	-0.298 (0.316)	-0.215 (0.328)	-0.216 (0.330)	-0.198 (0.329)
<i>Democracy</i>	1.486** (0.172)	1.425** (0.179)	1.449** (0.172)	1.354** (0.174)	1.399** (0.175)
<i>Anocracy</i>	1.36** (0.169)	1.453** (0.174)	1.451** (0.169)	1.441** (0.171)	1.442** (0.172)
<i>ln(Population)</i>	0.793** (0.038)	0.911** (0.042)	0.852** (0.040)	0.854** (0.039)	0.843** (0.039)
<i>ln(GDP PC)</i> <sub><i>t-1</i></sub>	0.681** (0.078)	0.411** (0.070)	0.264** (0.062)	0.097* (0.045)	0.096* (0.045)
<i>Neighboring Terrorism</i>	0.065** (0.011)	0.045** (0.010)	0.048** (0.010)	0.052** (0.011)	0.051** (0.011)
<i>Afghan &amp; Iraq Control</i>	-----	2.750** (0.431)	2.869** (0.418)	3.101** (0.413)	3.030** (0.413)
Constant	-15.863** (0.882)	-13.222** (0.787)	-12.469 (0.666)	-10.100** (0.560)	-9.877** (0.579)
N total	1,316	1,336	1,336	1,274	1,284
N Groups	132	134	134	128	129

Note: \*\*p<0.01, \*p<0.05, +p<0.1, two-tailed tests. GEE estimator pooling on country with an AR(1) error specification.

**Table 2:** Direct Effects of State Capacity and Minority Discrimination on Domestic Terrorism, 1998-2007 (Using MAR Measure)

<i>Model</i>	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	<i>Fragility</i>	<i>Effectiveness</i>	<i>Corruption</i>	<i>RPC-GDP</i>	<i>RPC-AGRI</i>
<i>Variables</i>					
<i>State Capacity<sub>t-1</sub></i>	0.159** (0.017)	-0.694** (0.106)	-0.380** (0.090)	0.105 (0.154)	0.104 (0.166)
<i>Min. Eco. Discrimination</i>	0.252** (0.037)	0.284** (0.044)	0.306** (0.042)	0.350** (0.039)	0.351** (0.039)
<i>Civil War<sub>t-1</sub></i>	0.629** (0.178)	0.261+ (0.150)	0.434** (0.157)	0.631** (0.162)	0.645** (0.164)
<i>IS War<sub>t-1</sub></i>	-0.322 (0.353)	-0.297 (0.241)	-0.208 (0.267)	-0.201 (0.290)	-0.197 (0.290)
<i>Democracy</i>	1.016** (0.166)	0.376** (0.174)	0.501** (0.170)	0.525** (0.172)	0.563** (0.171)
<i>Anocracy</i>	0.966** (0.165)	0.501** (0.166)	0.627** (0.166)	0.766** (0.169)	0.744** (0.169)
<i>ln(Population)</i>	0.729** (0.037)	0.817** (0.047)	0.743** (0.044)	0.737** (0.040)	0.733** (0.040)
<i>ln(GDP PC)<sub>t-1</sub></i>	0.723** (0.081)	0.542** (0.078)	0.304** (0.069)	0.088+ (0.049)	0.081+ (0.048)
<i>Neighboring Terrorism</i>	0.074** (0.010)	0.048** (0.008)	0.054** (0.009)	0.062** (0.010)	0.062** (0.010)
<i>Afghan &amp; Iraq Control</i>	-----	2.865** (0.450)	3.088** (0.449)	3.422** (0.440)	3.451** (0.440)
Constant	-15.689** (0.915)	-12.675 (0.867)	-10.208** (0.725)	-8.604** (0.573)	-8.525** (0.587)
N total	1,480	1,500	1,500	1,418	1,418
N Groups	150	152	152	144	145

Note: \*\*p<0.01, \*p<0.05, +p<0.1, two-tailed tests. GEE estimator pooling on country with an AR(1) error specification.

**Table 3:** The Conditional Effect of State Capacity on Domestic Terrorism Controlling for and Minority Discrimination, 1998-2007 (Using EPR Measure)

<i>Model</i>	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
<i>Variables</i>	<i>Fragility</i>	<i>Effectiveness</i>	<i>Corruption</i>	<i>RPC-GDP</i>	<i>RPC-AGRI</i>
<i>State Capacity<sub>t-1</sub></i>	0.141** (.017)	-0.567** (0.094)	-0.414** (0.080)	-0.077 (0.163)	-0.263 (0.177)
<i>Disc. Population %</i>	0.984** (0.118)	0.545** (0.056)	0.557** (0.055)	-0.001** (0.137)	0.027** (0.152)
<i>Capacity*Disc. Pop%</i>	-0.046** (0.008)	0.344** (0.057)	0.397** (0.060)	0.534** (0.128)	0.521** (0.147)
<i>Civil War<sub>t-1</sub></i>	0.877** (0.181)	0.881** (0.169)	1.054** (0.167)	1.066** (0.165)	1.100** (0.166)
<i>IS War<sub>t-1</sub></i>	-0.261 (0.371)	-0.204 (0.332)	-0.112 (0.342)	-0.165 (0.333)	-0.139 (0.333)
<i>Democracy</i>	1.297** (0.167)	1.177** (0.171)	1.193** (0.164)	1.123** (0.170)	1.201** (0.171)
<i>Anocracy</i>	1.191** (0.184)	1.197** (0.166)	1.201** (0.161)	1.205** (0.169)	1.242** (0.169)
<i>ln(Population)</i>	0.835** (0.038)	0.956** (0.040)	0.901** (0.038)	0.870** (0.038)	0.850** (0.038)
<i>ln(GDP PC)<sub>t-1</sub></i>	0.612** (0.076)	0.366** (0.067)	0.234** (0.059)	0.087** (0.044)	0.091* (0.044)
<i>Neighboring Terrorism</i>	0.068** (0.011)	0.050** (0.010)	0.052** (0.011)	0.056** (0.011)	0.054** (0.011)
<i>Afghan &amp; Iraq Control</i>	-----	2.316** (0.418)	2.456** (0.406)	2.851** (0.410)	2.779** (0.410)
Constant	-15.503** (0.864)	-13.061** (0.751)	-11.470** (0.635)	-9.780** (0.551)	-9.490** (0.568)
N total	1,316	1,336	1,336	1,274	1,284
N Groups	132	134	134	128	129

Note: \*\*p<0.01, \*p<0.05, +p<0.1, two-tailed tests. GEE estimator pooling on country with an AR(1) error specification.

**Table 4:** The Conditional Effect of State Capacity on Domestic Terrorism Controlling for and Minority Discrimination, 1998-2007 (Using MAR Measure)

<i>Model</i>	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
<i>Variables</i>	<i>Fragility</i>	<i>Effectiveness</i>	<i>Corruption</i>	<i>RPC-GDP</i>	<i>RPC-AGRI</i>
<i>State Capacity<sub>t-1</sub></i>	0.249** (.022)	-1.075** (0.122)	-1.289** (0.125)	-1.955** (0.320)	-2.359** (0.339)
<i>Min. Eco. Discrimination</i>	0.764** (0.075)	0.425** (0.042)	0.481** (0.043)	-0.716** (0.107)	-0.784** (0.115)
<i>Strength *Discrimination</i>	-0.045** (0.006)	0.407** (0.039)	0.491** (0.043)	1.151** (0.112)	1.235** (0.122)
<i>Civil War<sub>t-1</sub></i>	0.650** (0.100)	0.767** (0.169)	0.890** (0.168)	0.567** (0.168)	0.650** (0.168)
<i>IS War<sub>t-1</sub></i>	-0.138 (0.357)	-0.039 (0.320)	0.184 (0.331)	-0.295 (0.301)	-0.291 (0.309)
<i>Democracy</i>	0.882** (0.172)	0.699** (0.169)	0.764** (0.163)	0.335+ (0.176)	0.542** (0.173)
<i>Anocracy</i>	0.930** (0.169)	0.894** (0.166)	0.826** (0.160)	0.602** (0.174)	0.718** (0.171)
<i>ln(Population)</i>	0.761** (0.038)	0.838** (0.040)	0.807** (0.038)	0.831** (0.042)	0.787** (0.040)
<i>ln(GDP PC)<sub>t-1</sub></i>	0.774** (0.085)	0.268** (0.071)	0.227** (0.063)	0.113* (0.050)	0.102* (0.048)
<i>Neighboring Terrorism</i>	0.072** (0.011)	0.055** (0.010)	0.065** (0.011)	0.053** (0.010)	0.062** (0.010)
<i>Afghan &amp; Iraq Control</i>	-----	2.147** (0.433)	2.129** (0.420)	2.510** (0.446)	2.424** (0.442)
Constant	-17.401** (0.975)	-11.433** (0.758)	-11.020** (0.647)	-7.744** (0.620)	-7.016** (0.628)
N total	1,480	1,500	1,500	1,418	1,428
N Groups	150	152	152	144	145

Note: \*\*p<0.01, \*p<0.05, +p<0.1, two-tailed tests. GEE estimator pooling on country with an AR(1) error specification.

Appendix Table A: Summary Statistics

Variable	Observations	Mean	Standard Deviation	Minimum	Maximum
Domestic Terrorism	1596	5.29	26.37	0	673
Political Discrimination	1352	0.03	0.08	0	0.61
Economic Discrimination Index	1576	1.56	1.52	0	4
State Fragility Index	1550	9.41	6.73	0	24
Govt. Effectiveness	1570	-0.05	1.02	-2.34	2.37
Lack of Corruption	1570	-0.06	1.02	-1.91	2.58
Relative Extractive Cap. (GDP)	1490	0.98	0.36	0.11	3.61
Relative Extractive Cap. (Agri)	1500	0.97	0.33	0.11	3.11
Civil War	1596	0.04	0.21	0	1
International War	1596	0.007	0.08	0	1
Democracy	1531	0.52	0.49	0	1
Anocracy	1531	0.3	0.46	0	1
Population (Ln)	1596	8.99	1.72	4.34	14.08
Gross Domestic Product (Ln)	1596	8.39	1.38	5.14	11.42
Neighborhood Terrorism (Ln)	1596	5.21	3.9	1.47	34.88