

Portugal

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Geography and History

Portugal is a small, maritime country that lies on the westernmost point of continental Europe, jutting out into the eastern Atlantic Ocean. With a total land area of approximately 92,000 sq. km, it is smaller in size than many states in the United States. Mountainous in the north and east and largely flat with open plains in the south, Portugal goes from a temperate climate north of the Tejo estuary to a Mediterranean coastal climate in the southern Algarve region (Anderson 2000). Portugal's southern and westernmost districts border the Atlantic Ocean, giving Portugal 1,793 km of pristine coastline. On the east and north, Portugal abets its larger Iberian neighbor, Spain. No natural barrier separates the two countries, and yet surprisingly the territorial delimitation has remained largely unchanged for 800 years (Anderson 2000; McAlister 1984).

With a total population of 10.2 million (2003 estimate), Portugal ranks in the middle of the fifteen European Union (EU) nations. Such population figures have not translated into economic gain though. Portugal remains one of the poorest countries in western Europe. Only Greece ranks below Portugal in purchasing power parity (2001 figures) (Eurostat 2003), and in terms of overall human development, Portugal scores near the bottom of European nations. According to Eurostat, Por-

tugal's gross domestic product (GDP) per capita of U.S.\$16,059 in purchasing power parity (2001 figures) places it nearly 32 percent lower than the per capita income of the United Kingdom and 40 percent lower than The Netherlands. Further, the 2002 UN Human Development Index places Portugal twenty-eighth, even with Slovenia but behind both South Korea and Cyprus.

Still, Portugal has made significant progress since joining the European Community (EC) in 1986. Portugal's GDP per capita (in purchasing power parity) when it entered the EC was only 53 percent of the EC average. Today, it is closer to 80 percent (*The Economist* 2000b). Further, since joining the EC, successive democratically elected governments have liberalized the economy and sold off state-controlled industries, such as the financial and petroleum sectors, which had been nationalized following the 1974 military coup (Solsten 1993). Extensive economic aid from the EC has also helped finance infrastructure improvements, while foreign direct investment has quadrupled in the last fifteen years (Solsten 1993; *The Economist* 2003). Portugal's unemployment rate remains lower than many wealthier European countries, and its Internet and mobile telephone use have jumped dramatically (Eurostat 2003). Portugal also joined the European Monetary Union and

began circulating the new currency on January 1, 2002.

Despite these remarkable economic achievements, Portugal struggles to keep pace with its EU partners (Corkill 2002). In 2002 and 2003, Portugal's GDP increased by less than the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development average and its inflation remained higher. In part, this was a consequence of a spending binge by public authorities in the 1990s, and now these same officials are cutting spending to meet EU regulations (*The Economist*, 2000a). In 2001, Portugal violated the EU stability and growth pact limit with a budget deficit greater than 3 percent of its GDP. The EU Commission has been charged with punishing such transgressions, but as luck would have it, both Germany and France also violated the limits and the EU Council of Ministers has seen fit to allow these countries to slide (*The Economist* 2004a). Increasingly, Portugal faces tough competition from industries in central and eastern Europe (CIA *World Factbook* 2003), and as the EU expands eastward, Portugal may lose a substantial portion of its EU economic aid. However, with improvements in education, greater investment in research and development, a relatively young population, and continued access to new technology, Portugal remains on a path to catch up to the rest of Europe by 2020 (*The Economist* 2000b).

From the shores of this small Iberian country, European explorers first set sail to the far corners of the world. Prince Henry the Navigator, one of Portugal's most acclaimed mariners, looked out at the Atlantic from the white cliffs of Sagres in the early fifteenth century and effectively initiated Europe's age of exploration. A short time later (1497), Vasco da Gama, another Portuguese nav-

igator, took Portugal (and Europe) around the Cape of Good Hope and then north to India, helping secure trade routes that would make Portugal a world power (see Sidebar 1). Unfortunately, this global empire also brought about Portugal's eventual diminishment. Colonies in Africa, Asia, and South America became increasingly costly to administer, and more critically, Portugal began to face imperial competition from the likes of Spain, Holland, and Great Britain.

Portugal capitalized on independence, favorable geography, and early colony acquisition. As part of the territorial fron-

Sidebar 1 Imperial Portugal

The Treaty of Tordesillas (1494) divided the world into Spanish and Portuguese zones of control. The line of demarcation at 46 degrees west latitude and 134 degrees east longitude gave the Portuguese monarchy claim to lands as far west as Brazil (which had not yet been discovered by Europeans) and as far east as the Spice Islands (Indonesia). Portugal then acquired one of the largest colonial empires in history. Beginning with the Madeira Islands in 1419, Portugal went on to seize territories in Africa, South America, India, China, and the South Pacific. On December 20, 1999, Portugal's last territorial possession (Macao) officially became a Special Administrative Region of China.

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tier during the Christian reconquest of the Iberian Peninsula from the Moors, the area of what would become the independent nation of Portugal featured prominently in many of the early battlefield successes. By the early thirteenth century the Moors had not only retreated to the Andalusia region of what is now southern Spain, but Portugal received both recognition from the Crown of Leon and the Catholic Church (Vincent and Stradling 1994; Birmingham 1993). Independence brought political stability. With stability came increased economic development. As Spain continued to fight the Moors, Portugal turned to the sea. A seafaring tradition serendipitously met technological advances in shipbuilding and navigation. The seaports of Lisbon and Oporto served as the launching points for caravel expeditions out into the Atlantic. A half-century head start on Spain put Portugal in the lead for wealth and global influence (McAlister 1984).

Portugal's first attempt at democracy began in 1910, making it only the second country on the European continent (after France) to institute a republican form of government (Birmingham 1993; Anderson 2000). However, after sixteen years of political instability and inefficiency, the military stepped in to ensure order and amend an increasingly corrupt public system (Solsten 1993). Only a few years later (1933) Antonio de Oliveira Salazar assumed control of the regime and inaugurated an authoritarian political system that abolished political parties, rigged elections, limited the press, and built a police force that crushed domestic opposition (Solsten 1993; Ferreira and Marshall 1986). As a result of ill health, Salazar relinquished control of the dictatorship in 1968 to Marcello José das Neves Caetano, but Caetano continued

the fascist policies of his predecessor. Even with the leadership change, the regime could not withstand disastrous colonial wars in Africa in the 1960s and early 1970s, and the military was compelled to step in once again to prevent its own destruction on battlefields in Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea-Bissau (Vincent and Stradling 1994). Two years of factional and frequently violent political competition followed the 1974 coup, but ended with the drafting of a new constitution and the adoption of a strong presidency in 1976 (Solsten 1993).

Given Portugal's previous experience with democracy and the legacy of authoritarianism, the successful consolidation of the Second Republic has been a remarkable achievement (Solsten 1993; Robinson 2002). Even with the economic shocks that rocked the country in the late 1970s and the collapse of multiple governing coalitions, Portuguese democracy seems to have muddled through. From 1975 to 1979, Portugal suffered through nine separate governments, only one of which survived longer than a year (Strøm 1990), and Portugal had to wait for more than a decade after the 1974 revolution for the first majority government to take office (Sousa 2002, 138). Despite continued economic weakness in the 1980s, the governing coalition adopted a series of constitutional amendments that reduced the authority of the president while strengthening the prime minister (Solsten 1993). According to Solsten (1993), "The presidency remained an essential governing institution, but the balance of political power had shifted to favor the cabinet and the legislature, as in most other Western democracies." Perhaps more importantly, Portugal's military began a slow march back to the barracks, and in the decade that followed, the size of the army

Table 1 Portugal: Key Statistics

Type of government	Parliamentary democracy
Population (millions)	10.2 (2003)
Religion	Roman Catholic 97% (2003)
Main industries	Textiles; wood pulp, paper, and cork; oil refining; chemicals; fish canning
Main security threats	Instability resulting from immigration from North Africa; drugs; terrorism
Defense spending (% GDP)	2.1% (2001)
Size of military (thousands)	44 (2001–2002)
Number of civil wars since 1945	0
Number of interstate wars since 1945	1 (Afghanistan 2001)
Number of extrasystemic wars since 1945	3 (Angola, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique)

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was reduced dramatically and civilian control was strengthened (Vincent and Stradling 1994).

The parliamentary democracy established with the constitution of 1976 allocates political power to a five-year popularly elected president, a prime minister selected by the president from the majority party (or majority coalition), and a unicameral legislature with 230 seats elected under a proportional representation system (Anderson 2000, 5). Despite an uncertain beginning, Portugal's democracy has continued to deepen and diffuse under the Second Republic (Robinson 2002). Since 1982, Freedom House has awarded Portugal the highest ranking on its measure of political freedom. With additional protections adopted in 1991 and increased liberalization of the media, Portugal has ranked for over a decade now

equally high on Freedom House's measure of civil liberties (Freedom House 2003; Sousa 2002). Polity IV, another project aimed at measuring levels of democracy, maintains that Portugal has open and competitive elections for the executive, stable and enduring political participation, and strong legislative constraints on executive actions (Marshall and Jaggers 2000, 17–26). Further, Portugal's level of political corruption dropped by nearly 20 percent from 1995 to 2003. A score of 5.56 in 1995 placed Portugal slightly above Malaysia but below South Africa, while its 2003 score of 6.6 meant Portugal was more corrupt than France but less corrupt than either Cyprus or Taiwan. Despite allegations in 2002 regarding the mismanagement of public monies by Portugal's Socialist Party in power, businesspeople, country analysts,

and local residents all considered Portugal's public sector less corrupt in 2003 than in previous years (Transparency International 2003).

Regional Geopolitics

Despite Portugal's geographic isolation from the heartland of Europe, it remains a European state buffeted by the security concerns confronting countries further north and east. With the breaching of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the implosion of the Soviet state in 1991, European (and Portuguese) security changed fundamentally. For over half a century, superpower rivalry dominated European geopolitics as North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) military forces anticipated a Warsaw Pact strike through the Fulda Gap. In this volatile environment, western European countries shared U.S. concerns regarding their own political stability and economic development, as well as the containment of Soviet power (Duffield 2001). U.S. troops on the ground in West Germany strengthened its deterrent pledge, while large infusions of the greenback helped stabilize economies and avert communist influence. Portugal, for example, received \$229 million in U.S. economic and military assistance during the Marshall Plan period (1949–1952) (U.S. Agency for International Development 2003).

In the post-Cold War era, Europe faces challenges quite different than the ones that dominated discourse for forty-five years. With Russia and eastern Europe democratizing; western Europe stable, wealthy, and developed; and the United States a dominant power, attention has turned to economic integration, immigration, and terrorism (Bailes 1997). These new security issues invoke substantially

different political interests compared with Cold War concerns over territorial integrity and military competition and, consequently, necessitate different foreign policy responses. Although territorial disputes have not been entirely eliminated from European geopolitics in the post-Cold War period, the absence of any real military threat and continued U.S. security guarantees have allowed EU states to dramatically reduce their military budgets, invest increasingly in social welfare programs, and focus on integration.

With ten states scheduled to join the EU on May 1, 2004, the political and economic stability of countries in eastern and central Europe, as well as the Balkans, represents a primary foreign policy concern of European leaders. Indeed, hopes of a peace dividend following the collapse of the Soviet Union were shattered by three years of warfare among the peoples of the former Yugoslavia. With the help of the United States and NATO, the religious and ethnic conflagration was eventually controlled, but only after tens of thousands had lost their lives and many more were left homeless as refugees. Although a precarious peace has held in Bosnia for the last eight years, the Dayton Peace Accords did not end violence in the Balkans. In 1998, only three years after the establishment of peace in Bosnia, Serbian military forces attempted to reassert control over Kosovo (Foyle 2002; Moskowitz and Lantis 2002). The United States once again stepped in to enforce order and Milosevic eventually backed down. However, the potential for renewed violence in the Balkans cannot be ignored by European leaders. The desire for a rapid reaction military force comprised of, and led by, Europeans alone is in part a reaction to the most recent Balkan wars. European governments have had to acknowledge

their political and military weakness in failing to address such violence in their own backyard. Today, the EU administers the peacekeeping mission in Macedonia, but only after NATO agreed to supply the necessary equipment.

European governments also confront twin threats of terrorism and weapons proliferation. European police forces and intelligence agencies now work more closely with the United States and United Nations to monitor terrorist cells and prevent attacks (*The Economist* 2002). However, open borders across EU countries and Mediterranean shorelines too long to monitor effectively frustrate antiterrorist units. Plus, Europe's proximity to the Middle East and North Africa ensures relatively inexpensive passage from these politically charged and underdeveloped regions. Couple terrorism and open borders with illicit trade in weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and nightmare scenarios can easily be envisioned. In the last decade the United States has spent billions of dollars dismantling Soviet nuclear weapons, and Europe now recognizes the growing danger from Russia's WMD stockpiles, its deteriorating security situation, and the possible diffusion of weapons expertise (Allison 2004; *The Economist* 2001; *Business Week* 2001). Consequently, European governments now work more closely with the United States in monitoring and intercepting the proliferation of these deadly weapons (Feinstein and Slaughter 2004). Eight European governments, including Portugal, joined with the Bush administration in 2003 to cooperatively develop the political, economic, and military tools necessary to combat the spread of WMDs (Friedman 2003; U.S. Department of State 2003d).

Conflict Past and Present

Conflict History

Portugal emerged from Spanish domination in 1640. After sixty years of foreign rule, Portugal seized upon a Catalanian rebellion and an offer of aid from France to oust the Spanish garrison in Lisbon (Anderson 2000, 109). The new Bragança Dynasty immediately began securing allies against its aggressive Iberian neighbor. States such as Holland, France, and England agreed to align with Portugal to check further Spanish aggression on the peninsula. To secure such foreign support, Portugal offered lucrative trade deals. Even with the deterrent pledges of these European powers, war with Spain broke out in 1641. Almost immediately Spanish troops crossed the border near Olivença, and for the next twenty-five years, deadly combat continued along the border. Two events then changed the direction of the conflict. First, Charles II of England married Princess Catherine of Portugal and thereby solidified an alliance that would help ensure Portuguese sovereignty for the next 150 years. Second, Philip IV of Spain died in 1665 and his widow recognized the independence of Portugal (Anderson 2000, 118). Admittedly, Spain was distracted with events elsewhere. Thousands of Spanish troops were deployed in central Europe defending the Austrian branch of the Habsburg Dynasty in the Thirty Years' War (Brightwell 1982; Parker 1980).

Spanish attention turned away from Portugal after the death of another monarch (Carlos II) in 1700. The possible accession to the Spanish throne by a grandson of Louis XIV of France set off a frantic effort by most of the ruling houses of Europe to prevent the union of Bourbon France with the Spanish Empire. In the fol-

Following War of Spanish Succession, Portugal joined England, the Netherlands, Denmark, and Prussia to balance the rising power of France on the European continent. The new Bourbon king of Spain declared war on Portugal in 1704, Spanish troops seized the Portuguese province of Beira and planned to move on Lisbon. English troops turned the tide and a combined army of English and Portuguese soldiers took Madrid in 1706 and replaced the Bourbon with an Austrian Habsburg. Unfortunately, the choice of an Austrian Habsburg to ascend the Spanish throne became problematic in 1709 after the Holy Roman emperor died, thus catapulting the new Habsburg king of Spain into the emperor's chair as well. The union of Austria and Spain was just as unacceptable as the union of France and Spain. Finally, the Treaty of Utrecht brought the War of Spanish Succession to an end in 1714, but only after a Bourbon was placed back on the Spanish throne and it was agreed by all interested parties that France and Spain would permanently remain separate crowns (Bromley 1971).

Following the War of Spanish Succession, Portugal managed to remain neutral in the European struggles that continued. However, the French Revolution and the rise of Napoleon drew Portugal back into questions of European security. As the armies of the French Republic pressed into Belgium and Germany, Portugal aligned with England and Spain to contest the rising revolutionary power of the new France. With Spain's defeat, Portugal found itself in an awkward position, appeasing enemies and allies alike to avoid invasion. The Peace of Amiens in 1802 brought the wars of the French Revolution to an end, but Napoleon then began his quest for European dominance. Until 1807

Portugal successfully avoided Napoleon's gaze and was one of the few European states to remain free of French control. Indeed, Napoleon's battlefield successes at Ulm, Austerlitz, and Jena secured most of Europe for France by 1806 (Liddle Hart 1991). Napoleon's attention then turned north across the channel, and a blockade was instituted to bring the English to their knees. However, Napoleon's ability to deny continental access to British goods broke down on the Iberian Peninsula as illicit trade continued through Lisbon and Oporto. To stop the leak, Napoleon sent a French army into Portugal and seized Lisbon in 1807. The royal family fled to Brazil, and Portuguese soldiers were conscripted to fight for France.

Napoleon's empire began to collapse on the peninsula only a year later. A Spanish insurgency against French rule emerged after Napoleon's brother was placed on the Spanish throne. To aid these nascent guerrilla groups, England sent General Arthur Wellesley and 26,000 redcoats to Portugal (Liddle Hart 1991). For two years, between 1809 and 1811, Napoleon sought to crush rising opposition on the Iberian Peninsula. English and Portuguese troops successfully defended Lisbon as English naval strength maintained crucial supply lines and French regulars faced a devastating insurgency campaign in the countryside (Keegan 1994). Starvation eventually defeated Napoleon's peninsula army as it failed to overcome defensive fortifications established around Lisbon (Liddle Hart 1991, 115). British, Portuguese, and Spanish troops then pushed the remnants of the French force back across the Pyrenees to Toulouse by 1814. The peninsula campaign cost Napoleon nearly 400,000 casualties and Portugal lay in ruins. Not

only did combat ravage Portuguese infrastructure, but government revenue from trade also dropped precipitously and spending on the army led to financial devastation (Anderson 2000, 129).

With the defeat of Napoleon, Europe turned to industrialization, colony acquisition, and political repression. What interstate conflict did occur remained limited, and issues in contention were typically handled through active diplomacy by the major powers. Political leaders in the major ruling houses of Europe also were preoccupied with the growing number of groups seeking democratic reforms. Indeed, in 1829 Portugal found itself confronting political transformation as liberal groups sought to impose constitutional constraints on the monarchy. Conservatives (absolute monarchists) fought such changes, prompting a five-year civil war that resulted in nearly 20,000 deaths (Anderson 2000; Sarkees 2000). Even though clashes between conservatives, moderates, and liberals continued for the next half century, the conflict remained limited.

As the growing military might of Germany and Russia began to upset the geopolitical status quo toward the end of the nineteenth century, Portugal sought neutrality once again. However, its longstanding alliance with Britain and concerns over German intentions toward its African colonies eventually drew Portugal into World War I on the Allied side. Although skirmishes with German troops in southwest Africa in 1914 did not lead to war, the same was not true for the seizing of German merchant ships detained in Lisbon harbor at England's request in 1916 (Anderson 2000, 143). Germany and the Habsburg Empire immediately declared war on Portugal. Interestingly, Britain had attempted to appease both Portugal and

Germany leading up to the war. A secret agreement signed in 1898 between the British and German governments agreed to carve up Portuguese colonies in Africa if Portugal failed to control them. Yet soon after this agreement, the British reaffirmed its commitment to the defense of Portugal and its colonies (Joll 1984). In the last two years of the conflict Portugal sent 40,000 troops to the western front (60,000 Portuguese troops also served in Mozambique). Over 7,000 died and nearly 14,000 more suffered grievous injuries fighting in the mud of Flanders (Solsten 1993).

Portugal did not fare well after the Great War. Political instability and economic underdevelopment continued unabated, and the depression that followed in the 1930s made matters even worse. As Europe marched toward war again, the newly constituted Salazar regime served all sides by facilitating the movement of war materiel and foodstuffs throughout Europe. German guns reached Franco's rebels in Spain by way of Lisbon, and tungsten from Portuguese mines was shipped to Germany, Italy, and Great Britain (Anderson 2000, 148). Portugal's colonies also helped provide food to Axis and Allied nations alike. As early as 1940, Salazar anticipated an Allied victory, and in 1943 the United States and Great Britain were granted air bases in the Azores (Solsten 1993). Although Portuguese troops did not actively participate in World War II battles, nearly 20,000 Portuguese citizens volunteered to fight alongside Franco in the Spanish civil war and 8,000 of them died (Ferreira and Marshall 1986).

After World War II, Portugal refused to relinquish control of its colonies despite pressure from the international community. In 1951 the Salazar regime took an even more radical move by passing a law

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defining its colonial holdings as overseas territories, and the media were prohibited from using the word "colony" (Ferreira and Marshall 1986). However, Portugal could not silence calls for independence and it no longer possessed the strength to suppress the emergence of liberation movements. Although in 1961 the Portuguese garrison in Goa gave up without much of a fight in the face of an overwhelming Indian force, Salazar was determined to contest attempts to overthrow Portuguese authority in its more lucrative African colonies.

Opposition to Portuguese rule began in Angola in March 1961. By 1964, insurgencies had also developed in Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau (see Table 2). To combat the guerrilla movements, the Salazar regime increased the size of the army from a mere 10,000 soldiers in 1964 to over 200,000 by 1972 (Ferreira and Marshall 1986). But the losses continued and resistance within the Portuguese military began to grow. Further, Soviet surface-to-air missiles were introduced into the conflicts in the early 1970s, and Portuguese pilots began to pay the price. For an army that had not seen active engagement since

World War I, battles in Africa were dispiriting (Anderson 2000). Junior officers often served in one colony only to be transferred to another soon after a tour of duty had been completed. With thousands of casualties in each of the three African colonies over a ten-year period (and tens of thousands of African casualties), Portugal had little to show for its struggle. Indeed, when Guinea-Bissau declared independence in 1973, sixty countries recognized the new African state within a matter of weeks (Anderson 2002, 160). By 1975, Salazar's fascist regime had been toppled, and 500 years of Portuguese control in West Africa came to an end (see Sidebar 2).

Current and Potential Military Confrontation

Portugal faces few serious security risks today. The colonial wars have ended, dramatic reductions have occurred in the defense budget, and Portugal's attention remains fixed on European integration. Since 1975, Portugal has found itself in only three militarized interstate disputes and all three involved cooperation with U.S.-led actions: two in the Balkans contesting Serbian aggression (1998–2000)

Table 2 Portugal: African Possessions

<i>Colony</i>	<i>Date of Colonization</i>	<i>Date of Independence</i>	<i>Colonial War Dates</i>	<i>Colonial War Fatalities</i>
Madeira Islands	1419	Autonomous region of Portugal	—	—
Guinea-Bissau	1446	September 10, 1974	1962–1974	~15,000
Cape Verde Islands	1462	July 5, 1975	1962–1974	—
São Tomé & Príncipe	1485	July 12, 1975	—	—
Mozambique	1505	June 25, 1975	1964–1975	~30,000
Angola	1574	November 11, 1975	1961–1975	~55,000

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Sidebar 2 The Carnation Revolution

After more than a decade of colonial conflict in Africa, opposition within the Portuguese military to the governing elite reached the critical stage. On April 25, 1974 at 12:25 A.M., army units across the country seized important government buildings, including the presidential palace. As soldiers marched into Lisbon—accompanied by tank columns—euphoric crowds greeted the military men with fresh flowers. Only one shot was fired in defense of the Salazar dictatorship as the Portuguese people celebrated both the end of the colonial wars and the beginning of democracy.

Source

Anderson, James M. 2000. *The History of Portugal*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.

and the U.S.-led war in Afghanistan to remove the Taliban regime and eradicate al-Qaeda terrorists. In the Kosovo air campaign, Portugal contributed seven F-16A-B fighter planes and one C-130 transport (Daalder and O'Hanlon 2000), while Portugal's contributions in Afghanistan were limited to a medical team and one C-130 cargo plane (Rumsfeld and Portes 2002). The Portuguese government also supported the U.S.-led war to overthrow the Baathist dictatorship in Iraq, and 128 Portuguese military police arrived in the southern Iraqi city of Nasariyah in November 2003 to participate in an international stabilization force.

The potential for future militarized confrontation remains limited. Portugal may accept supporting roles in UN-, NATO-, or U.S.-led efforts abroad, but only in unusual circumstances will Por-

tuguese military units actively engage enemy forces. Closer to home, Portugal is at peace with its larger Iberian neighbor, Spain, and it is highly unlikely that the relationship will become militarized at any time in the near future. Although one existing territorial claim remains (Olivença) between Portugal and Spain going back to the Congress of Vienna in 1815, Portugal rarely invokes its rights over the disputed territory, and neither side has any interest in militarizing the issue.

Alliance Structure

Given its size, Portugal has historically faced threats from larger and more powerful European countries. To ensure sovereignty, Portugal has actively sought allies to help deter aggressive neighbors. In return for aid, Portugal has offered two prizes. First, port cities such as Lisbon and Oporto have opened their harbors to foreign merchant ships, while trading rights with Portugal's colonies also could be granted. Second, Portugal's geographic location on the southwest corner of the European continent has provided maritime states, such as Great Britain and the United States, a bridgehead to land troops and supplies for operations against potential European challengers.

The defensive alliance with England represents Portugal's most long-standing partnership. The Treaty of Windsor signed in 1386 professed eternal friendship and committed both sides to defensive aid if threatened by foreign aggression (Anderson 2000, 40-41). Since the fourteenth century the alliance between England and Portugal has been reaffirmed numerous times, including a twelve-year pact involving both France and Spain signed in 1834 (Bennett 1997; Gibler and

Sarkees forthcoming). The defensive alliance with Great Britain again was authorized in 1899 and theoretically remains in effect although NATO has now largely replaced this bilateral pact. Portugal's only other security commitment involves a neutrality agreement signed with Spain five months before the Nazi invasion of Poland (but after the Spanish civil war). This agreement (the Iberian pact) committed both Spain and Portugal to defend the peninsula and helped maintain the neutrality of both states during World War II.

Toward the end of World War II, Portugal foresaw the growing dominance of U.S. naval and airpower. Given its Atlantic coastline, the U.S. ability to resupply Portugal via its port facilities offered the greatest protection. However, joining NATO did not solely revolve around the perceived Soviet threat to western Europe. Indeed, Portugal's distance from what would have been U.S.-Soviet battlefields meant that even a USSR bent on territorial expansion would only remotely threaten Portuguese sovereignty. NATO rather allowed Portugal the ability to retain its colonial possessions while offering U.S. forces access to airfields and naval facilities. The geostrategic importance of the Azores bases, port facilities to resupply Europe from the south, and access to the Mediterranean via the Straits of Gibraltar all meant that the United States tolerated Portuguese policies in its colonies. NATO also provided a means by which the Salazar regime could acquire military armaments. But ultimately Portugal's African wars estranged it from NATO allies and prevented deeper integration into the NATO command structure.

Regime transition in the mid-1970s and democratic consolidation soon after that

led to a greater role for Portuguese forces in the NATO alliance. Indeed, by 1980 Portugal not only resumed training exercises with NATO forces, but also began participating fully in the Nuclear Planning Group (Solsten 1993). The Iberian Atlantic Command (IBERLANT), a major subcommand of the Allied Command Atlantic (ACLANT), which was upgraded in 1971, was offered to Portugal in 1982. Although no permanent combat forces were assigned to IBERLANT during peacetime, the command remained strategically significant in connecting North America and Europe (Solsten 1993). With Spain's full integration into NATO's military command structure in 1999 and the streamlining of NATO structure that continued at Prague in 2003, ACLANT was abolished and all forces were placed under control of Allied Command Operations (ACO). Much of the command and control infrastructure for the southwest regional command of NATO-South has been relocated to Madrid, but Portugal remains important to the alliance and Lisbon was chosen in March 2004 to host the new joint headquarters, which represents one of three operational-level headquarters under ACO.

Size and Structure of the Military

Since the collapse of the Soviet empire in 1991, NATO has significantly reduced its standing forces. Troop commitments by European NATO states have been slashed 35 percent since 1992, while naval vessels and air force combat squadrons have witnessed reductions of 30 percent and 40 percent, respectively (NATO 2001). Of course, readiness levels have also correspondingly dropped over this time period. Portugal, like its NATO allies, has also seen fit to reduce the overall size of its

military establishment. Recent Portuguese governments have increasingly allocated scarce public resources to social welfare and economic development projects. Total military personnel dropped 64 percent from 1994 to 2001, and today available military manpower hovers around only 44,000 soldiers (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute [SIPRI] 2003; Cordesman 2002; CIA *World Factbook* 2003).

The bureaucratic organization of the Portuguese military follows a common template. The three service commands (army, navy, and air force) report directly to their individual chiefs of staff, who all reside under the minister of defense. The president then serves as commander-in-chief. The three military services are divided into regional commands based on geographic location. All three branches have continent, Azores, and Madeira commands, although the army is further divided at home into north, central, south, and Lisbon regions. Portugal also deploys a small marine force housed within the navy.

The army fields the bulk of Portugal's uniformed personnel. Nearly 60 percent of Portugal's active armed forces reside in the army (25,000 soldiers). Portugal deploys only 7,500 air force personnel and 11,000 sailors (Cordesman 2002). Although Portugal does not field the smallest NATO contingent, its forces have not kept pace with the latest technological advancements in weapons systems and communications. In recent years, the United States has provided a small amount of military aid (approximately U.S.\$800,000) to help modernize Portugal's small force. In terms of available military equipment, Portugal in 2001 reported 187 battle tanks (mostly U.S. Pattons), 370 AIFVs, 6 armored personnel carriers (APCs), and 134

artillery pieces. The air force maintains 101 total combat aircraft, with 51 fixed-wing planes, plus 5 armed helicopters, while the navy has 39 total ships, which includes 31 patrol boats, 6 frigates, and 2 submarines (Cordesman 2002).

Despite such a small force structure, Portugal has actively participated in recent NATO-, UN-, and U.S.-led peacekeeping operations. Portugal, in fact, volunteered one of the largest troop contributions to IFOR (the implementation force for the Dayton Peace Accords). One thousand soldiers from the Airborne Infantry Battalion deployed to Bosnia in 1995 to help prevent further sectarian violence. Additional Portuguese forces help disarm groups in Macedonia (now under EU control), and a battle group of 323 soldiers patrols northwest of Sarajevo. In Afghanistan, a Portuguese medical team operates under NATO authority, while Portuguese peacekeepers now patrol in southern Iraq and in the former Portuguese colony of East Timor. Small numbers of Portuguese soldiers further contribute to UN peacekeeping operations in Angola and Mozambique, while observers participate in UN missions in the western Sahara, Congo, Guatemala, and the Central Africa Republic (SIPRI 2003).

Budget

In recent years Portugal's defense establishment has contracted as budgets have been slashed to meet EU regulations. In 2002, Portugal allocated only U.S.\$2.3 billion to its military. This represented less than 5 percent of total government expenditures and only 2.3 percent of Portugal's GDP. In both procurement and research and development, Portugal spends less than nearly all of its NATO allies. In 2001, Portugal allocated U.S.\$366 million to weapons procurement and only \$4

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million to research and development. Spain, in contrast, spent over \$1 billion on procurement and \$174 million on research and development in the same year (Cordesman 2002).

Although Portugal historically has had a small domestic defense industry producing mostly ordinance and small arms, today Portugal hardly exports any weapons at all. Consequently, Portugal imports needed military equipment from abroad. The United States has transferred small numbers of F-16s, APCs, self-propelled artillery pieces, and ammunition, while states such as France, Spain, and Great Britain supply additional equipment (SIPRI 2003). Portugal also ratified the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) and neither possesses nuclear weapons today nor had a program in the past to build them.

Civil-Military Relations/The Role of the Military in Domestic Politics

The Portuguese military has historically played an important role in civil affairs. During the nineteenth century, for example, military leaders generally opposed the return of a strong monarchy and consequently helped move the nation toward a republic (Anderson 2000; Solsten 1993). In fact, two years after the king and heir were murdered by republican activists in 1908, the military staged a revolt in Lisbon that eventually dismantled the 800-year-old monarchy and replaced it with only the second constitutional democracy on the European continent (Anderson 2000, 8). Political divisions prevented the early success of Portugal's first republic. Plus, a world soon consumed by trench warfare acerbated the economic and political difficulties faced by this nascent democracy. Soon, riots broke out in the

streets of Lisbon. Until the final overthrow of Portugal's first democracy in 1926, the military served a caretaker role as numerous governing coalitions collapsed and the assassination of political leaders became almost commonplace (Anderson 2000; Solsten 1993).

When the military dictatorship failed to revive an already weak economy, it sought help from economist Antonio de Oliveira Salazar at Coimbra University (Ferreira and Marshall, 1986). This economist began almost immediately to lay the groundwork for his own dictatorship, which was officially inaugurated with the adoption of a new constitution in 1933. Salazar managed the military well and kept it at bay for nearly thirty years. However, opposition to the dictatorship emerged during the colonial wars in the 1960s, culminating in a bloodless military coup in 1974 (the Carnation Revolution). The Portuguese military, in particular, resented being scapegoated for military failures in Goa and the African colonies. As the casualties mounted, junior officers within the military establishment began voicing frustration at the government's inept policies. Because organized dissent by the general population had been silenced by a brutal secret police force, opposition to the fascist regime emerged and grew within the military (Ferreira and Marshall, 1986). Finally, on April 25, 1974, military forces marched into Lisbon and occupied the city center. The military assumed control, but pledged to hold elections and transfer authority to civilian officials in short order. However, splits within the military emerged over its role in the new state, and a Council of Revolution was established by military leaders, which was to possess authority over both the executive and legislative branches of any

new government. After radical elements in the military were finally purged in 1975, the military then agreed to elections and the official transfer of power to civilian authorities.

The constitution of 1976 preserved a special role for the military in ensuring stable, democratic governance. The Council of Revolution continued to advise civilian authorities on both foreign and domestic policy and actually retained a veto over parliamentary decision making. Civilian governments soon faced opposition from the council and support emerged for its dissolution. In 1982, constitutional amendments officially stripped the military of its role in the public policy process and relegated it to a pure advisory role on national security issues only (Ferreira and Marshall 1986; Anderson 2000). Despite losing formal institutional power, the military retained influence over civilian authorities for a number of years thereafter. However, this influence waned over the next decade, and by 1991 civilian control was strengthened by giving greater institutional power to the civilian minister of defense (Solsten 1993). Today, authority squarely resides in the civilian branches of the Portuguese republic.

Terrorism

During the Salazar dictatorship, state-sponsored repression prevented most forms of political dissent. However, in the years following the Carnation Revolution, political violence exploded, only to be silenced with the establishment of the Second Republic and the economic progress that began soon after. In 1974, for instance, Portugal experienced nine acts of violent political dissent, which included guerrilla wars, purges, riots, and

government crises (Banks, Muller, and Overstreet 2002). The level of domestic political violence peaked in 1975 with twenty-two acts, but decreased in the following years as the Second Republic consolidated. Only ten and eight acts of violent political dissent were reported in 1976 and 1977, respectively (Banks, Muller, and Overstreet 2002). Today, few acts of political violence occur within Portugal. Civil society remains largely satisfied with both the current status quo and the direction of policy change. Plus, few foreign terrorist organizations view Portugal as a worthwhile target. From 1990–1999, only one political assassination occurred in Portugal (in 1990), while France suffered five and Spain six over the same time period (Banks, Muller, and Overstreet 2002).

Acts of terrorism have declined over the last decade, both worldwide and in Europe. From a high of 666 total terrorist incidents in 1987, the U.S. Department of State reported only 348 in 2001, with the vast majority occurring in Latin America and Asia (U.S. Department of State 2001). In western Europe, the number of incidents has also diminished significantly over the last decade. In 1995, 272 terrorist acts were reported, but this dropped to only 17 in 2001. Although Portugal has experienced few, if any, terrorist incidents in the last ten years, the attacks against New York and Washington, D.C., in 2001 propelled the issue to the forefront of even Portugal's policy agenda. In 2002, for instance, Portugal recommended to its European partners that a common security plan for addressing terrorist threats was urgently needed. As chair of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), Portugal directed member states to attend to political and juridical limi-

tations on combating terrorism. The new charter adopted by the OSCE in December 2002 committed member states to coordinate law enforcement and border security to more effectively disrupt terrorist networks. Further, member states agreed to confront the political, economic, and environmental sources of terrorism (OSCE 2002). To reinforce Portugal's commitment to eradicating this form of violent political dissent, Portugal hosted a world forum designed to explore further the underlying causes of terrorism. Portuguese Foreign Minister Antonio Martins da Cruz insisted on the opening day of the conference that the goal of the summit "should be not to prevent only acts of terrorism but also to prevent people from becoming terrorists" (*EU Business* 2003).

Portugal, like its Iberian neighbor, has been a strong supporter of the U.S. global war on terrorism. On March 16, 2003, Portugal's prime minister Jose Manuel Durao Barroso joined U.S. President George Bush, Britain's prime minister Tony Blair, and Spain's president Jose Maria Aznar to reaffirm their transatlantic alliance and commit themselves to "face and overcome the twin threats of the twenty-first century: terrorism and the spread of weapons of mass destruction." (U.S. Department of State 2003). Despite the absence of terrorist acts within Portugal, the Portuguese prime minister has recognized the continued threat terrorist groups pose even to his small and geographically remote country. To be sure, travel across the unprotected Atlantic tends to dissuade illegal immigrants and radical Islamists even though North Africa sits less than 200 km from Portuguese shores. Spain, France, Italy, and Greece all present easier targets for shore landings, and the Mediterranean

Sea offers a less dangerous ocean voyage for illicit smuggling operations. However, Barroso's concerns appear well founded. In January 2003 sixteen alleged members of an al-Qaeda cell were arrested next door in Barcelona, Spain, with explosives and other bomb-making materials (U.S. Department of State 2003b). With open borders across EU states, the presence of terrorist groups in any one country clearly poses a threat to others as well.

Relationship with the United States

Portugal's ties with the United States date back to the Washington administration. Formal relations opened in 1791 after Portugal became the first neutral country to recognize U.S. independence (U.S. Department of State 2003a). The bilateral relationship strengthened during and immediately after World War II as Portugal provided access to air bases and port facilities and later became a founding member of the NATO alliance. The Lajes Air Base on Terceira Island in the Azores provides a refueling stop for military transports crossing from the United States and Canada while additionally offering a landing site for antisubmarine aircraft working in the Atlantic (Solsten 1993). The air base still houses nearly 1,000 U.S. Air Force personnel and continues to serve as an important link between North America and Europe.

In 1951, the United States and Portugal formalized access to Lajes with a bilateral security pact. Nearly every U.S. president since Eisenhower has traveled to Terceira to reiterate the importance of the relationship and the air facility (Solsten 1993). Although the Portuguese government refused access to U.S. warplanes during the 1986 El Dorado Canyon operation against Libya, it was the only NATO country to

allow the United States to resupply Israel from its air bases during the 1973 Yom Kippur War (Lesser 2000). Portugal also provided comprehensive access to the Lajes air base during the first Gulf War. Thirty-three tanker aircraft and over 600 U.S. Air Force personnel deployed to Lajes to support the massive airlift to the Persian Gulf. Despite downsizing after the Soviet collapse, the air facility at Lajes provided support for nearly every military operation in Europe, Africa, and Southeast Asia in the 1990s. The United States and Portugal reaffirmed the bilateral pact in June of 1995. According to the U.S. State Department (U.S. Department of State 2003a), "The Agreement on Cooperation and Defense provides for continued U.S. access to the Lajes Air Base in the Azores as well as cooperation in nonmilitary endeavors."

Since World War II, the United States has also provided significant economic and military assistance to Portugal. From 1946 to 2003 the U.S. government supplied the Portuguese government with over \$2 billion dollars in grants and \$1 billion in loans, which included funds for schools, housing, sanitation, disaster assistance, and military equipment (U.S. Agency for International Development 2003). Although the United States tended to look the other way when it came to Portugal's colonial wars in the 1960s and 1970s, the relationship improved markedly with Portugal's transition to democratic rule in 1976. Over the last twenty-eight years, political, economic, and cultural ties between the two countries have only gotten stronger. Bilateral trade in 2001 was estimated to be worth more than \$2.8 billion dollars, which was nearly a 60 percent increase from 1994 (U.S. Department of State 2003a). More importantly, perhaps, the latest U.S. census estimates that 1.3 million people of Portuguese ancestry now

live in the United States, while 20,000 Americans reside in Portugal (U.S. Department of State 2003a).

The Future

Portugal has moved from the center of international politics to the periphery over the last 600 years. The world no longer divides along lines established in Lisbon nor does the world's wealth flow through Portugal's ports. But increasingly this small nation on the tip of continental Europe is reasserting its identity and playing a useful role in Europe and the world. To be sure, the last thirty years have been particularly trying. From dictatorship to democracy, statism to free market, colonial conflict to peace and political stability, the changes since the end of the dictatorship have been both deep and diffuse. Portugal, though, has managed these complex transitions skillfully. Today, Portuguese democracy appears well established and the economy more diversified than in the past.

Still, Portugal faces many challenges. The economy remains in recession, unemployment has increased over 6 percent in the last year, and the government budget has fallen into the red (*The Economist* 2004b). According to the Eurobarometer (European Opinion Research Group 2003), the economy, crime, and drug trafficking represent the most important issues in Portugal, and while support for the EU remains high, it has dropped over fifteen percentage points in the last twelve years. Further, satisfaction with national democracy was lower in Portugal in 2003 than in any other EU country and dissatisfaction higher than all except Italy. Clearly, Portugal's rapid social, economic, and political development over the last thirty years has not come without costs.

However, Portugal appears increasingly confident and forward-looking. Five hundred years after rounding the tip of Africa, Portugal may not have the extensive empire it once commanded, but today it is firmly anchored in Europe, at peace with its neighbors, and prosperity seems within reach.

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DEFENSE AND SECURITY

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and Security Policies*

Volume 2: New Zealand–Yugoslavia

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